“Dwelling on unlikely scenarios, or inflating threats because they have limited quantities of top-notch equipment, is not productive. Nor is it wise to dwell on anecdotal or genuine evidence of past successes made possible in part by lengthy buildups of sea-deployed forces and logistics … a luxury we may not always enjoy.”
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