Why hearts and minds matter

[Administrator]

Counterinsurgency has no "easy button." As every soldier knows, insurgents don't fight fair. Instead of wearing uniforms to signify their combatant status, they normally "hide in the open" in civilian guise; they infiltrate police and army units; they destroy infrastructure vital to civilian well-being; they kidnap, torture, shoot, behead and mutilate anybody who isn't their ally; and they slaughter women and children like cattle.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2002037

[P.Lucullus]

In reading press summaries of the proposed new Counterinsurgency manual, one must conclude: much of counterinsurgency is bunk. In the spirit of encouraging a "counter-insurgency insurgency," here is a consideration of the proposed "paradoxes of counterinsurgency":

"Paradox 1: The More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You Are" There's merit in this, for those who have the wit to see it: the only posture in effective counterinsurgency is offensive. Troops and commanders bound by a force-protection mentality don't have the chance, difficult as it is, of earning legitimacy by a proactive, on the ground securing of their AO. We'd do better to change even the name of the mission: from Combined Joint Task Force, to Combined Joint Field Force.

"Paradox 2: The More Force You Use, the Less Effective You Are" In what war was this most true? Was this applicable after the fall of Baghdad? In Fallujah? Or in clearing Guadalcanal? We have seen that our enemies in the field are the equal in fanaticism of the Japanese in the Pacific or the SS, and should delude ourselves no more about means of accomodation. It can only be hoped that this McClellanist drivel escapes the embrace of ***ma.

"Paradox 3: The More Successful Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force That Can Be Used and the More Risk That Must Be Accepted." There's a grain of wax in this swine's ear: Risk must be accepted. Foot patrols, in tandem with mobile reserve backup, need to encounter risk and engage it with direct fire. There's no time for airstrikes. We will have superior firepower in engagements that we risk and can- plan for-reinforcement tactically when engaged.

"Paradox 4: Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction" See paradox two, or idiocy, whatever comes up first in the dictionary. This looks to gain future ominous notoriety as the Mes. river valley massacres continue. This was the best strategy in Bosnia? In Rwanda? Hue city? Perhaps this is to encourage the Iraqis to "stand up"- like we did the Shi'a in '91?

"Paradox 5: The Best Weapons for Counterinsurgency Do Not Shoot" Well, sort of. In a conflict prevention or post-conflict reconciliation phase, this could be true. When you have the fact of a masive insurgency and a real civil war, you have to look to your arms. The best strategy is to deny impunity, sanctuary, refuge and repetitions of success to the insurgent. Not because it is easy, but because it is hard.

"Paradox 6: The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Sometimes Better Than Our Doing It Well" See above. The host nation doesn't appear to be ready to stand if we walk away. We can't do it all but we still have to lead doing a lot by example.

"Paradox 7: If a Tactic Works This Week, It Will Not Work Next Week; If It Works in This Province, It Will Not Work in the Next" Not bad- no point following an outfought strategy, let alone an itinerant Englishman or Chinese sophist. But some things must work in every command: accountability to the laws of war. A unified sense of mission and discipline that is not left to the varied egos and prejudices of commmanders. The CJTF needs to tighten up the tradition of general officer autonomy, get field officers into action and deeply commited to the discipline of troops and treatment of the Iraqi people.

"Paradox 8: Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing" A particularly mischievous defeatist screed. How about tactical and operational defeat? What does that guarantee? Tactical successes can be had. They must be initiated and pursued- Napoleonically, not by breaking contact at the first local success, or sitting it out waiting for airstrikes. This also feeds another fallacy- that we win all the battles. We lose 90%. Every massacre, ambush, IED, assasination, is a defeat. Every township surrendered to insurgent emirates is triumph heard through our enemies' world, even if ignored or attributed to "wise restraint" by our imbecile press. Treasure the enemy in his cities. There he can be found, outmaneuvered, outgunned, cut off, killed in great numbers.

"Paradox 9: Most of the Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals" Then they should start making them. We seem to have extraordinarily poor return for the most overeducated staff corps in history. There is a truism though, that operational planning for counterinsurgency should be "reversed"- a proved Brigade should make the plans for its division offensive, not corps HQ making plans for its elements. But where is the Iron Brigade that will not fail?