subscribe  |    email  |    print  |    continue the debate

Clarifying or redefining roles and missions for each of the armed services is a key step in not only eliminating redundancies or waste, but also ensuring all mission areas are adequately addressed by a designated and responsible service [“Request for proposals,” March].

This step is also necessary to reduce or eliminate the rivalries between services vying for a larger budget share. Just as important as clearly defining the swim lanes for each service is to also provide guidance for the interfaces to eliminate seams. As a superpower, our enemies will not attack our strengths, but rather our weaknesses, which typically lie in our seams. Equally important, it should not be an attempt to make a single joint service all wearing the same uniform. Service customs and traditions are one of the strengths that help each of our armed forces maintain their elite status.

At a first cut, a simplistic approach would be to assign maritime missions to the Navy, land missions to the Army, airspace missions to the Air Force and expeditionary missions to the Marine Corps. Special operations forces and Reserve/National Guard forces would also need to be included in this process.

The airspace mission area will be the most controversial, as each service owns aircraft or weapons systems whose ordnance travels through the airspace dimension. The Navy should be allowed to own aircraft that protect the maritime assets. Similarly, the Army and Marine Corps should never be hindered from using inherent aviation or indirect-fire assets to support their missions. Services should continue to own the systems that support their respective missions; however, a single service must be in charge of defining the control measures and command-and-control functions of that respective mission area. We must also apply the best of breed tactics, techniques and procedures from how we do business.

A different approach should be taken on the function of equipping our armed services. My suggestion would be to take procurement dollars away from the services and hold them at a joint level. Based on defined roles and missions, each of the services should represent its requirements for weapons system procurements in terms of the capabilities needed to perform its assigned roles and missions. With input from each of the combatant commanders, the Joint Staff then would divide the limited procurement budget among programs that provide the highest priority capabilities to the war fighters.

Rather than service-level systems or materiel commands performing the function of procuring weapons systems to fulfill requirements, a joint acquisition command should be stood up. This process would be designed to remove the fight for defense budget procurement dollars at the service level and raise this decision-making to the Joint Staff level, where it could be more evenly weighed with combatant commander inputs.

Major acquisition programs often build too much momentum from individual service priorities and industry lobbying to be significantly shaped by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. A joint acquisition command would help remove service rivalries and provide a stronger negotiating position with industry. This change would reduce service infighting for procurement dollars, displacing them to the function of submitting and defending the capabilities required to perform the services’ assigned roles and missions.

A final recommendation for Congress is to eliminate congressional earmarks. Defense capability should not be skewed by re-election agendas or political bureaucracy. Based on National Command Authority strategy, let the Defense Department determine and prioritize what is needed to support national defense objectives.

Lt. Col. Doug Schueler, Marine Corps

Commander, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262

Okinawa, Japan